Doctrine of the Mean

The Doctrine of the Mean is Aristotle's account of how moral virtues are structured. Each moral virtue lies as a mean between two vices, one of excess and one of deficiency. Courage is the mean between rashness (excess) and cowardice (deficiency); generosity is the mean between prodigality and miserliness; truthfulness is the mean between boastfulness and self-deprecation. The doctrine is one of the most-quoted single pieces of Western moral theory and the structural backbone of Aristotelian ethics.

Definition

The Doctrine of the Mean (Greek to meson, the middle or mean) is presented systematically in Nicomachean Ethics II.6–9. Aristotle's technical definition (1106b36–1107a8): virtue is a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean, i.e., the mean relative to us, this being determined by reason, that is, by the rule by which the practically wise person would determine it.

Four features deserve attention. First, virtue is a state of character (hexis) — not a feeling, not an action, but a settled disposition. Second, virtue is concerned with choice — the agent must choose virtuously, not merely happen to act virtuously. Third, the mean is relative to us, not the arithmetic average between extremes; what counts as the mean depends on the agent and the situation. Fourth, the mean is determined by the practically wise person exercising phronesis; no rule can specify in advance what the mean will be in a given case.

Origin

The doctrine is original to Aristotle in its developed form, though predecessors are visible. The Pythagorean tradition had associated virtue with proportion and harmony; Plato had used the language of measure (metrios) in the Philebus and elsewhere. What Aristotle adds is the systematic structural analysis: every moral virtue is a mean between two specific vices, and the moral vocabulary can be organized accordingly.

The core claim

The core claim of the doctrine has three parts.

Each virtue has a specific structure. Virtue is not a vague disposition to be good; it is a specific mean between specific extremes. To be virtuous in a particular respect is to have hit the mean in that respect; the moral vocabulary names the means and the extremes separately.

The mean is not the arithmetic middle. Aristotle is explicit (1106a26–36) that the mean relative to us is not the arithmetic average. The amount of food appropriate for the trained athlete is not the average between starvation and gluttony but the specific amount appropriate to that person at that time. The mean varies with the agent, the circumstances, the stakes, and the available means.

The mean is found by practical wisdom, not by rule. The doctrine is not a moral algorithm. No rule can specify in advance what the mean will be in a given case. Finding the mean requires phronesis — the trained perception that recognizes what this situation calls for. The Doctrine of the Mean is therefore inseparable from the Aristotelian account of practical wisdom.

Examples

Nicomachean Ethics II.7 lists Aristotle's canonical examples:

The list is not exhaustive; Aristotle treats it as illustrative of the structural pattern rather than as a final taxonomy.

Limits of the doctrine

Aristotle is careful about where the doctrine does and does not apply.

Not all actions are subject to the mean. Some actions — adultery, theft, murder — are wrong simply, not by excess or deficiency. There is no appropriate amount of murder. The doctrine applies to virtues that admit of degree (courage, generosity, temperance); some actions are entirely outside the domain.

Not all feelings are subject to the mean. Some feelings — envy, spite, shamelessness — are wrong as such, not by excess or deficiency. There is no appropriate amount of envy. The doctrine applies to feelings that can be appropriate at some level and inappropriate at others.

The mean is not the same in all things. Aristotle gives the famous example of the athlete and the food: the right amount for one is not the right amount for another. The point generalizes: what is courage in one situation may be rashness in another and cowardice in a third.

Common confusions

The doctrine is not a recommendation of moderation in the modern sense. The doctrine is not the claim that virtue lies in always doing things in moderate amounts. It is the structural claim that each virtue is structured as a mean between specific vices. The mean in courage is the right amount of confronting fear — which may be substantial, not moderate, when the situation calls for it.

The mean is not the average of the extremes. The misreading produces the absurd consequence that the courageous person is half-cowardly and half-rash, which Aristotle explicitly denies. The mean is determined by what the situation actually calls for, not by averaging the extremes.

The doctrine does not provide a decision procedure. No rule produces the mean; only the practically wise person, exercising phronesis, perceives what the situation calls for. The doctrine names the structure of virtue; it does not eliminate the need for the trained perception of the virtuous agent.

Place in the wiki

The Doctrine of the Mean is a satellite of the Pillar concept Virtue, naming the structural feature that organizes the Aristotelian account of the moral virtues. It is closely related to Phronesis (the capacity that finds the mean in the situation) and to Eudaimonia (the end the virtues are organized around).

Further reading

• Virtue — the Pillar concept this satellites
• Aristotle — the author of the doctrine
• Nicomachean Ethics — the central text
• Phronesis — the capacity that finds the mean
• Aristotelianism — the tradition

Satellite of Virtue. The structural account of how Aristotelian moral virtues are organized.