Pragmatism

Introduction

Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking is the substantial popularizing statement of pragmatism by William James, published in 1907 by Longmans, Green and Co. The substantial book consists of the eight lectures James substantially delivered at the Lowell Institute in Boston in November-December 1906 and at Columbia University in New York in January 1907; the substantial revised text of the lectures is the substantial published book.

The substantial book substantially gave pragmatism its public name and its substantial early-twentieth-century shape. The substantial pragmatic maxim that Charles Sanders Peirce had substantially formulated in 1878 (How to Make Our Ideas Clear) had substantially attracted limited attention; James's substantial 1898 lecture Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results substantially brought pragmatism to substantial public attention; the substantial 1906–07 lectures and the substantial 1907 book substantially established pragmatism as one of the substantial dominant philosophical movements of the early twentieth century.

James's substantial version of pragmatism substantially departed from Peirce's substantial original formulations in several substantial respects, especially over the substantial theory of truth. Peirce substantially renamed his own position pragmaticism ("a word ugly enough to be safe from kidnappers") to substantially distinguish it from James's substantial looser usage; the substantial dispute between the substantial Peircean and substantial Jamesian versions of pragmatism has substantially continued through subsequent scholarship.

Composition and publication

James had been substantially developing the pragmatist position since the substantial late 1890s. The substantial 1898 lecture Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results (delivered at the University of California, Berkeley) substantially brought pragmatism to public attention; the substantial 1900s saw the substantial development of the systematic articulation that the 1906–07 lectures substantially crystallize.

The substantial Lowell Lectures in Boston (November-December 1906) and the substantial Columbia Lectures in New York (January 1907) substantially presented the substantial eight lectures that constitute the substantial book. James substantially revised the substantial lectures for publication; the substantial 1907 book is the substantial result.

The substantial book attracted substantial immediate response, including substantial critical engagement from Bertrand Russell, G. E. Moore, F. H. Bradley, A. O. Lovejoy, and many others. James substantially responded in The Meaning of Truth (1909), a substantial polemical defense and substantial elaboration of the position that substantially constitutes the companion volume to Pragmatism.

Central doctrines

The pragmatic method

The substantial first lecture, The Present Dilemma in Philosophy, substantially sets up the substantial distinction between the substantial tender-minded (rationalist, idealist, intellectualist, religious) and the substantial tough-minded (empiricist, materialist, skeptical) philosophical temperaments. The substantial pragmatic method is substantially proposed as a substantial way to substantially mediate between the two temperaments and to substantially clarify what is substantially at stake in the substantial disputes between them.

The substantial pragmatic method, as James substantially presents it in the substantial second lecture (What Pragmatism Means), proceeds by substantially asking what difference it would substantially make in actual experience if one position substantially rather than another were true. If no substantial difference can be substantially identified, the substantial dispute is substantially empty: the substantial positions are substantially the same dispute under substantial different labels. If substantial differences can be substantially identified, the substantial dispute is substantially genuine and the substantial differences substantially indicate what is substantially at stake.

The pragmatic theory of truth

The substantial most-contested doctrine of the book is the substantial pragmatic theory of truth, developed in the substantial sixth and seventh lectures (Pragmatism's Conception of Truth and Pragmatism and Humanism). James substantially holds that the substantial truth of a belief is substantially constituted by its substantial working in experience — by its substantial successful integration with substantial other beliefs, its substantial productive consequences in action, its substantial cash value in the long run.

The substantial doctrine has been continuously contested. Substantial critics (Russell, Moore, Bradley) substantially attacked it as substantially confusing truth with utility — a substantial belief might substantially be useful without substantially being true, and a substantial belief might substantially be true without substantially being useful. James substantially responded that the substantial criticism substantially presupposed a substantial conception of truth as substantial correspondence with a substantial fixed reality that pragmatism substantially rejects; the substantial pragmatist substantially holds that there is no substantial fact about truth that is substantially independent of the substantial inquiry that substantially establishes it.

The substantial dispute substantially continues. The substantial Peircean version of pragmatism (substantially defended by Cheryl Misak and others) substantially holds that the substantial Jamesian formulations are substantially loose and that the substantial defensible core of pragmatism is the substantial Peircean account of truth as what substantial inquiry would substantially converge on at the substantial ideal limit. The substantial Rortian neo-pragmatist tradition substantially follows the substantial Jamesian formulations more closely.

Pragmatism and religion

The substantial final lecture, Pragmatism and Religion, substantially addresses the substantial question of how the substantial pragmatic method substantially applies to substantial religious belief. James substantially argues that the substantial pragmatic method substantially licenses substantial religious belief under substantial appropriate conditions: where the substantial choice between religious and non-religious belief is substantially live, substantially forced, and substantially momentous, and where the substantial evidence is substantially insufficient to substantially decide, the substantial believer is substantially entitled to substantially choose according to their substantial passional nature.

The substantial position is substantially continuous with James's substantial earlier The Will to Believe (1896) and with the substantial broader project of The Varieties of Religious Experience (1902). The substantial doctrine has been continuously contested in the substantial subsequent literature on the substantial ethics of belief and the substantial pragmatist philosophy of religion.

Reception

The substantial immediate reception was substantial across multiple dimensions. The substantial book substantially attracted both popular and academic engagement; James's substantial accessible prose and substantial lecture format substantially made the substantial book one of the substantial most-read works of academic philosophy of its era.

The substantial critical engagement was substantial. Russell's substantial essay William James's Conception of Truth (in Philosophical Essays, 1910) substantially attacked the substantial Jamesian theory of truth; Moore's substantial substantial engagement substantially extended the attack; Bradley's substantial engagement from the British Idealist position substantially attacked pragmatism from a substantially different direction.

The substantial reception has been substantial and continuous through the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. The substantial Peirce-James dispute substantially structures contemporary substantial pragmatism scholarship; the substantial Rorty neo-pragmatist movement of the 1980s substantially recovered the Jamesian formulations; the substantial work of Cheryl Misak, Hilary Putnam, and the substantial neo-pragmatist tradition substantially continues to engage the book.

Place in the wiki

Pragmatism is the substantial canonical popularizing statement of the substantial pragmatist tradition and one of the substantial most-read works of early-twentieth-century American philosophy. It is the substantial principal source for the substantial Jamesian formulations of pragmatism that substantially shaped the substantial early-twentieth-century reception and that substantially continue to anchor the substantial contemporary engagement with the substantial tradition.

Further reading

• William James — the author
• Pragmatism — the substantial tradition the book substantially shaped
• Peirce — the substantial founding pragmatist whose substantial formulations the book substantially modifies
• Dewey — the substantial contemporary who substantially systematized pragmatism
• Varieties of Religious Experience — the substantial earlier James work the substantial final lecture engages
• Belief Systems — the substantial concept the Jamesian analysis of religious belief substantially helps articulate
• Coherence Without Certainty — the substantial epistemic posture the Jamesian pragmatism substantially articulates

William James's 1907 substantial popularizing statement of pragmatism. The substantial book that gave the substantial tradition its public name and substantially shaped its early-twentieth-century reception.